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Remedies for Misappropriation of Motion
Picture and Television Story Ideas
by JONATHAN D. COHEN*
I
Introduction
The sine qua non of major motion picture and television pro-
ductions is the story idea. Substantial capital expenditures are
required to bring the creative concept of the story to fruition.'
Naturally, the foundation of such an economic undertaking as a
film production must itself have value. Indeed, it has been judi-
cially recognized that the possessor of an original idea has a
commodity of value to a producer.2 Difficulties arise, however,
when legal protection is sought for a motion picture or televi-
sion story idea that may be incompletely committed to paper,
since ideas themselves cannot be copyrighted under the Fed-
eral Copyright Act.' Rather, it is the author's expression of his
idea that may be afforded federal copyright protection,4 and if
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A., California State University, Northridge,
1980. The author wishes to thank Neil Boorstyn, Adjunct Professor, Hastings College
of the Law, and Martin Sweeney, Claims Administrator, Writers Guild of America,
West, for their valuable assistance in the completion of this note. A version of this
note has been entered in the 1985 Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition, sponsored
by the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.
1. The costs of producing, distributing, and exhibiting a motion picture are stag-
gering. D. Gordon, Why the Movie Majors Are Major, 42 SIGHT AND SOuND 194 (1973),
reprinted in THE AMERICAN FILM INDUSTRY 462 (T. Balio ed. 1976).
2. See Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956). The California
Supreme Court stated:
As counsel for the Writers Guild aptly say, ideas "are not freely usable by the
entertainment media until the latter are made aware of them." The pro-
ducer may think up the idea himself, dress it and portray it; or he may
purchase either the conveyance of the idea alone or a manuscript embodying
the idea in the author's concept of a literary vehicle giving it form, adaptation
and expression. It cannot be doubted that some ideas are of value to a
producer.
Id. at 731, 299 P.2d at 265 (emphasis added).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976). See also Libott, Round the Prickly Pear: The Idea-
Expression Fallacy in a Mass Communications World, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 735, 736
(1967).
4. See Libott, supra note 3, at 735-36.
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his mode of expression happens to be a "synopsis," "outline,"
"treatment," or "format,"' 5 the author may have to look else-
where for adequate protection for his story idea.
This note considers the areas of law in California that offer
protections for motion picture and television story ideas as em-
bodied in the above-mentioned short forms of expression.6 It
begins with a brief discussion of the common short forms of
idea expression, which may leave the underlying idea open to
misappropriation.7 It then examines the remedies and theories
on which redress may be based, including federal and state
copyright protection, contract theories, and other possible
grounds. The note concludes with suggested tactics for protect-
5. The definitions of these terms, for the purposes of this note, are as follows.
Synopsis: the first stage in expressing the original story idea. R. SPOrrISWOODE, FILM
AND ITS TECHNIQUES 14 (1951). It is often a brief, rough sketch of character and situa-
tion from which a reader familiar with screenwriting may inferentially understand
the totality of the writer's concept.
Outline: in the motion picture and television industries, this is understood to be "a
scene-by-scene description of the story, in narrative form." S. BRONFELD, WRITING
FOR FILM AND TELEVISION 67 (1981) (emphasis omitted). An outline is often used
instead of a synopsis as the first representation of the writer's idea.
Treatment: an adaptation outline of how the writer intends to treat an existing story
in another form, such as a novel or a play. W. ROOT, WRITING THE SCRIPT: A PRACTI-
CAL GUIDE FOR FILMS AND TELEVISION 171-72 (1979).
Format: A television series idea. More specifically, a format is:
a written presentation which sets forth the framework of the serial or epi-
sodic series within which the central running characters will operate and
which framework is intended to be repeated in each episode, the setting,
theme, premise or general story line of the proposed serial or episodic series
and the central running characters which are distinct and identifiable includ-
ing detailed characterizations and the interplay of such characters. It may
also include one or more suggested story lines for individual episodes.
1966 Writers Guild of America-Society of Motion Picture and Television Film Pro-
ducers Memorandum of Minimum Basic Agreement at 1 (June 15, 1966), quoted in
Libott, supra note 3, at 758.
6. This note focuses on California because this state is a center for motion pic-
ture and television production. It is not restricted to California statutory and common
law, however, since it also discusses federal copyright protection, which is, of course,
also available to California screenwriters.
7. For the purposes of this note, the word "misappropriation" refers to a situa-
tion in which a writer's motion picture or television story concept comes to the atten-
tion of production personnel who wrongfully make use of it without payment to the
writer. Misappropriation of motion picture and television story ideas is a significant
problem in the film industry. Telephone interview with Mr. Martin Sweeney, Claims
Administrator, Writers Guild of America, West (Jan. 3, 1984). See Kaplan, Implied
Contract and the Law of Literary Property, 42 CAL. L. REV. 28 (1954) (noting the
familiar character of cases in which misappropriation of an idea by a producer is al-
leged); M. MAYER, THE FILM INDUSTRIES 186 (1978) (characterizing utilization of a
writer's idea without payment as a typical circumstance where "raw" ideas are
concerned).
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ing an idea, both prior to its submission to production personnel
and during litigation following misappropriation.
II
The Short Forms of Idea Expression
Many story idea submissions take abbreviated forms, such as
synopses, outlines, treatments, and formats. This practice de-
veloped in response to the fact that production units receive a
considerable number of story idea submissions. For example,
one television network received an estimated two thousand
story ideas during the course of one year.' Such an inundation
results in the preference among production personnel for eas-
ily-digestible forms. Also, technical considerations and story
problems may necessitate a producer's corrections in the
writer's film concept, which are more easily made at the treat-
ment stage than at the screenplay stage. Since the treatment
stage is more tentative, it affords room for changes without ex-
tensive revision of existing material.9 The industry custom of
brevity in idea expression has even resulted in oral submission
of story concepts. Free-lance writers who wish to write for new
television series, for example, often verbally present the idea to
the producer of the show.'0
There appears to be confusion within the film industry as to
the availability of copyright protection for short forms. One
source of confusion may be the Register of Copyright's official
stance vis-d-vis such forms. A 1954 Copyright Office adminis-
trative bulletin stated that a television program concept or
script would not be registered unless it is "sufficiently devel-
oped that a program could actually be produced from it.""
Since the enactment of the Federal Copyright Act of 1976, how-
ever, those modes of expression less than "sufficiently devel-
oped" are no longer excluded from federal protection.
According to the General Counsel's Office of the United States
Copyright Office, the policy toward such forms has changed
with the advent of the 1976 Act.' 2 Nevertheless, no official pol-
icy statement has been issued. This lack of clarity is reflected
8. See ROOT, supra note 5, at 145.
9. See E. VALE, THE TECHNIQUE OF SCREEN AND TELEVISION WRITING 262 (1982).
10. See W. MILLER, SCREENWRITING FOR NARRATIVE FILM AND TELEVISION 30
(1980).
11. 57 COPYRIGHT OFFICE BULL. § 1 (1954), cited in Libott, supra note 3, at 759.
12. Telephone interview with Kevin Maricle of the General Counsel's Office,
No. 1]
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in a book published in 1979 in which a screenwriting authority
interpreted the federal copyright law as excluding short forms
of idea expression,'13 and argued that copyrightability is an in-
centive for writing a complete screenplay.14 A definitive state-
ment of policy regarding such forms of expression may help




The Federal Copyright Act of 1976 extends protection to
"original works of authorship in any tangible medium of ex-
pression.' u For works completed on or after January 1, 1978,
this protection endures "for a term consisting of the life of the
author and fifty years after the author's death.' 6 This most
powerful of the protections available for creative works is
based on a property theory.'7 It is the property interest that
makes copyright such a potent protection, for, as Professor
Nimmer notes,
It is usually said that "an essential element of ... property is
the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it," and that
such a right may be enforced as against any member of the
public, not just against persons standing in a trust, contractual
or other specialized relationship. A copyright owner possesses
a property interest in this absolute sense.'"
It is important to recognize the property basis of copyright,
since an abstract idea is not property for the purposes of the
Federal Copyright Act.' 9 A motion picture or television writer
United States Copyright Office (Feb. 2, 1984). Such forms probably would be granted
copyright protection if they satisfied the basic requirements of the new Act. Id.
13. See ROOT, supra note 5, at 175.
14. Id. at 174.
15. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), which provides, in pertinent part, "Copyright protection
subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid
of a machine or device ..
16. Id. § 302(a).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 50-133, for a discussion of state statutory
and other protections, such as, common law copyright, quasi-contract, and fraud.
These latter protections do not offer the benefit of a clearly delineated statutory right
to protection of property supported by a large body of intellectual property case law.
18. Nimmer, The Law of Ideas, 27 S. CAL. L. REv. 119, 120 (1954).
19. See supra note 3.
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who has an idea which he has not committed to a tangible mode
of expression does not "own" that idea.20
Even when the idea has been expressed, the idea itself is not
owned by its originator. Rather, it is the expression of the idea
that is the subject of ownership and is therefore protected by
copyright." Furthermore, the courts have held that the grant-
ing of copyright protection to ideas would contravene the pur-
pose of the copyright laws,22 since such protection would
restrict the ability of other artists to use that idea, which would,
in turn, diminish the advancement of the arts.23 This view is
premised on the judicial belief that ideas collectively form a
public stock of conceptual material, open to any author, who
may draw freely from them.24
The manner in which this distinction between the idea and
its expression operates to the writer's detriment becomes clear
in view of a hypothetical suit for the infringement of a synopsis.
Suppose that a free-lance motion picture screenwriter has con-
ceived an idea for a motion picture feature. The tangible me-
dium in which he has fixed his original idea 25 is a ten-page
synopsis, setting forth protagonist and antagonist with a rough
description of each, elements of the main story line, and expla-
nations of sideplots that join the primary plot at the climax and
resolve at the denouement. It substantially embodies the
writer's concept but is only an abbreviated presentation of the
writer's idea, and much would have to be added before it could
be made into a motion picture.
The writer applies for copyright registration, which is
granted, and a certificate of registration is issued.26 Upon re-
ceipt of the certificate, the writer submits the synopsis to an
20. See Nimmer, supra note 18, at 119; Libott, supra note 3, at 737.
21. Nirnmer, supra note 18, at 119.
22. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing that Congress shall have the power
"[t]o promote the progress of Science and useful Arts"). See also Nimmer, supra note
18, at 120.
23. See Nimmer, supra note 18, at 120, (citing Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404
(S.D.N.Y. 1913)).
24. Id.
25. See supra notes 12 and 15.
26. 17 U.S.C. § 410, which provides, in pertinent part:
(a) When, after examination, the Register of Copyrights determines that...
the material deposited constitutes copyrightable subject matter and that the
other legal and formal requirements of this title have been met, the Register
shall register the claim and issue to the applicant a certificate of registration
under the seal of the Copyright Office.
No. 1)
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independent production company. After several months pass,
the company indicates that it cannot use the story idea.
Two years later, a motion picture is released with the identi-
cal characters and plot concepts embodied in the writer's ten-
page synopsis. He institutes a suit for infringement of the copy-
right covering his synopsis. The elements of a cause of action
for copyright infringement are (1) proof that plaintiff owns the
copyright and (2) a wrongful copying of the protected work by
the defendant. A copying is demonstrated by circumstantial
evidence showing access by the defendant to plaintiff's work
and substantial similarity between defendant's work and the
copyrighted work.25
Given the facts of the foregoing hypothetical situation, the
plaintiff can prove ownership without difficulty: he has the
certificate of copyright registration for his synopsis. Further,
there should not be a problem demonstrating the access re-
quirement of the copying element, since all he must show is
that the defendant "had a reasonable opportunity to see or hear
plaintiff's work."29 The several months during which the sy-
nopsis remained in the defendant's possession should suffice.
The problem arises when the plaintiff attempts to prove the
requisite "substantial similarity" between his synopsis and the
full-length feature film produced by the defendants. As Pro-
fessor Boorstyn notes:
To constitute an infringement, the copying must go beyond
merely copying the idea of the work and must substantially
copy its expression .... The ultimate determination therefore
in an infringement suit is whether there is substantial similar-
ity not only of the general ideas . . .of the work, but of the
expression of those ideas.3"
Here the work claimed to have been infringed is a ten-page
synopsis, which, because of its brief form, cannot possibly set
forth all the nuances of a two and one-half hour motion picture.
Arguably, then, the film is not a copy of the synopsis as a ten-
page literary expression of an idea, and an action for copyright
27. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1162 (9th Cir. 1977); see generally N. BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW 28-98 (1981).
28. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., 562 F.2d at 1162. This case involved an
action for infringement of plaintiff's "H.R. Pufnstuf" television program by produc-
tion of defendant McDonald's television commercials. Here, infringement was found.
29. See N. BOORSTYN, supra note 27, at 290.
30. Id. at 294 (emphasis added).
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infringement might very well be unsuccessful.3 '
This is not to say that there is no hope of obtaining a remedy
in the case of such a misappropriation. The writer might focus
on the production unit's own synopsis, outline, or, indeed, final
script as evidence of infringement, rather than on the film it-
self. This as yet untried approach 32 would pose one major diffi-
culty: the problem of obtaining proof that the defendants
developed their own synopsis or outline from plaintiff's work.
Most likely, a production unit would begin with a short idea
form in order to consider its merit before going into the costlier
script mode,33 but the tools of discovery must be wielded with
diligence on the part of the plaintiff in order that such a work
be brought to light.34
If this evidentiary hurdle is cleared, the proof that a substan-
tially similar synopsis or outline was developed by defendant is
quite valuable in supporting a cause of action for infringement.
Indeed, in Miller v. Columbia Broadcasting System,35 the court
stated that the copying element required for a cause of action
for infringement may be satisfied by direct evidence of copying
or, as previously discussed, by proving access and substantial
similarity. Significantly, the court characterized direct evi-
31. When federal copyright expression is obtained for a full screenplay, the same
rule concerning the protection of the expression, as distinct from the idea, applies.
However, since the expression of the author's concepts of plot, theme, and character
in a full script are much more complete than in a synopsis or any other brief form of
idea submitted, infringement can be more easily demonstrated, assuming that the de-
fendant's motion picture represented its plot, themes, and characters in substantially
the same way that the plaintiff did in his screenplay.
32. Infringement through the use of the production unit's own short form re-
mains untried in the federal copyright context. In Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715,
741-43, 299 P.2d 257, 271-73 (1956), however, the California Supreme Court noted that
plaintiff's synopsis appeared to be a protectible literary property under common law
copyright. As such, the court argued that it would be wrong for defendants to take it
and use it in the production of their motion picture, if no compensation were offered.
Id. at 750, 299 P.2d at 277.
33. See Fink v. Goodson-Todman Prods., Ltd., 9 Cal. App. 3d 996, 88 Cal. Rptr. 679
(1970). There, plaintiff submitted a presentation, i.e., a format, to defendants for con-
sideration as the basis for a new television series. Defendants did not purchase plain-
tiff's concept, but produced an allegedly similar series. Part of the evidence
introduced at trial was a presentation written by an employee of defendants.
34. Because it is in the producer's interests to demonstrate the disparity between
plaintiff's ten-page synopsis and a two and one-half hour feature film, such evidence is
not likely to be easily obtained.
35. 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 502 (C.D. Cal. 1980). Plaintiff was an ex-convict who
wrote a three-page story about life in prison. Defendants purchased a nine-month
option on the story, which was never exercised. Defendants subsequently produced
the television series "KAZ," which plaintiff claimed infringed his story. Id. at 503.
COMM/ENT L. J.
dence as proof that "[i]n producing the television show, the de-
fendants must have actually copied plaintiff's copyrighted
material. '36 If the plaintiff in the hypothetical suit could prove
such copying in the form of a synopsis/outline used in the pro-
duction of the defendant's motion picture, this language from
Miller could be very helpful in establishing copyright
infringement.
If a plaintiff has proved ownership of the copyright as well as
a copying, the liability issue is resolved. If a plaintiff must
prove substantial similarity under the copying element, how-
ever, a possible pitfall is the scenes d faire doctrine .3  The doc-
trine was lucidly explained in Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp. v. MCA Inc. ,38 as follows:
A certain type of scene, or a certain situation of standard char-
acters vis-a-vis each other becomes so commonplace, so cus-
tomary, that it is almost always found-and the viewer or
listener almost always may expect to see or hear it whenever
the play, the movie or the book deals with a given topic, or
involves what is called a certain genre .... A "scenes A faire"
which is a standard, common, expectable treatment or happen-
ing is not protectible under this doctrine because of its com-
monness. It is in the public domain.
39
In the hypothetical infringement suit, it can readily be seen
that the portion of the writer's synopsis that is protectible
under federal copyright law could be severely pared down if
the defendants successfully argue that it includes many plot
concepts that fall within the scenes d faire doctrine. 4' This ar-
gument would naturally vitiate substantial similarity.
Assuming that the writer could prevail in his infringement
36. Id. at 504 (emphasis added).
37. The doctrine was first enunciated in Schwarz v. Universal Pictures Co., 85 F.
Supp. 270 (S.D. Cal. 1945). See Note, Copyright Infringement: An Argument for the
Elimination of the Scenes d Faire Doctrine, 5 CoMM/ENT L.J. 147, 157-58 (1982), for a
good discussion of this seminal case and the doctrine in general.
38. 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 200 (C.D. Cal. 1980). In this case, Twentieth Century-Fox
alleged infringement of its film "Star Wars" by defendants' "Battlestar Galactica."
Because there was no substantial similarity between plaintiff's and defendants' works,
no infringement was found.
39. Id. at 207 (quoting Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40; 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
239 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)) (emphasis added).
40. See id. Though Twentieth Century-Fox involved a different situation, defend-
ants in that case attempted to use this defensive tactic. The court, however, declined
to base its finding of insufficient similarity on the doctrine, due to the "fact conflict in
[the] evidence which probably arises from the newness of [the science fiction] genre."
Id. at 207.
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suit, the question of damages arises. The amount available de-
pends on whether the plaintiff requests the actual damages suf-
fered as a result of the infringement together with the
defendant's profits from the infringement or he elects to re-
cover statutory damages.41 Actual damages are generally mea-
sured by reference to any sales or profits plaintiff may have
lost, in addition to any diminution in the market value of plain-
tiff's work.'
An election to recover statutory damages may be made by
plaintiff "at any time before final judgment is rendered, '43 and
the statutory damages that may be awarded range from $250 to
$10,000, at the court's discretion. 4 This amount may seem
rather small in light of the huge profits attainable in the mo-
tion picture and television industries. 45 Fifty thousand dollars
are available, however, if the plaintiff can prove that the in-
fringement was done willfully. 4 Professor Boorstyn notes that
"[n]either the Act of 1909 nor the Act of 1976 define[s] a willful
infringement.
47
While no court in California has yet addressed this issue, one
federal court in New York found a willful infringement and
awarded statutory damages. In Fallaci v. New Gazette Literary
41. 17 U.S.C. § 504, which provides, in pertinent part:
(a) In General. Except as otherwise provided by this title, an infringer of
copyright is liable for either-
(1) the copyright owner's actual damages and any additional profits of the
infringer, as provided by subsection (b); or
(2) statutory damages, as provided by subsection (c).
(b) Actual Damages and Profits. The copyright owner is entitled to recover
the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement,
and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and
are not taken into account in computing the actual damages ....
42. See N. BOORSTYN, supra note 27, at 301.
43. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), which provides, in pertinent part:
(c) Statutory Damages.
(1) Except as provided by clause (2) of this subsection, the copyright owner
may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead
of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringe-
ments involved in the action ... in a sum of not less than $250 or more than
$10,000 as the court considers just ....
44. Id.
45. See M. MAYER, supra note 7, at ix.
46. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2), which provides, in pertinent part:
In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and the
court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its dis-
cretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more
than $50,000 ....
47. N. BooRsTYN, supra note 27, at 305.
COMM/ENT L. J.
Corp.,48 plaintiff was an interviewer whose article appeared in
the Washington Post. Defendant publisher reprinted the arti-
cle without authorization. The court held that plaintiff estab-
lished a prima facie case of willful infringement by arguing that
since defendant was a publisher of a copyrighted newspaper, it
knew or should have known that its unauthorized republica-
tion of a newspaper article constituted copyright infringe-
ment.49 A production company's willful infringement of a
copyrighted work could similarly be proven. A plaintiff could
argue that since the company copyrights its own products-
films-it would have knowledge of its violation. The plaintiff
would then be required to adduce evidence showing that de-
fendant knew that the synopsis was copyrighted.
Since the infringement of a screenwriter's work usually leads
to a major motion picture or television series, the defendant's
profits are likely to be in excess of the $50,000 willful infringe-
ment damages. Therefore, it would be best to request actual
damages and profits in the complaint. In any case, the option to
request statutory damages remains open up to the final judg-
ment, should the situation warrant that choice.
B. California Civil Code Section 980
California, a center for the motion picture and television in-
dustries, has a statute which supplements federal copyright
protection for creative works. A codification of common law
copyright, Civil Code Section 98050 has an interesting history.
First enacted in 1872, the section declared that:
The author of any product of the mind, whether it is an inven-
tion, or a composition in letters or art, . . . has an exclusive
ownership therein, and in the representation or expression
thereof, which continues so long as the product and the repre-
sentations or expressions thereof made by him remain in his
possession.
51
There were two significant effects of this language. First, it ex-
tended protection to an idea itself, in addition to its expression;
second, it characterized the right of the author as a right of
ownership, hence a property right. Such a view concerning the
protectibility of abstract ideas ran counter to the traditional
48. 568 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
49. Id. at 1173.
50. CAL. CIV. CODE § 980 (West 1982).
51. CAL. CIV. CODE § 980 historical note (West 1982) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 7
No. 1] MISAPPROPRIATION OF STORY IDEAS
conception,5 2 and the statute was amended in 1947 to read:
"The author or proprietor of any composition letters or art has
an exclusive ownership in the representation or expression
thereof as against all persons except one who creates the same
or similar composition." 53 The amendment eliminated the lan-
guage granting an ownership right in a product of the mind,
and the protection was restricted to representations or expres-
sions of the idea.
In 1982, Section 980 was again amended in order to avoid pre-
emption by the Federal Copyright Act.' It now provides, in
pertinent part:
The author of any original work of authorship that is not fixed
in any tangible medium of expression has an exclusive owner-
ship in the representation or expression thereof as against all
persons except one who originally and independently creates
the same or similar work.55
The result is a clear codification of common law copyright,
which gives to the author the right of first publication,' i.e., the
right "to make the work available to the general public."
57
More importantly, it gives the author an exclusive right in any
tangible expressions that anyone may make of his abstract
idea. 8 While this effect is not the same as granting a property
right in the abstract idea itself, it would amount to the same
thing in the case of a misappropriation, since an idea cannot be
turned into a profitable item by one who misappropriates it un-
til he has reduced it to some form of expression. Theoretically,
52. See Jack, The Legal Protection of Abstract Ideas: A Remedies Approach, 18
IDEA 7, 11 (1976). See also Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 40 Cal. 2d 778, 789 (1953) (character-
izing the property view as traditional).
53. Historical note, supra note 51, at 547 (emphasis added).
54. See Legislative Counsel's Digest, Cal. A.B. 3483 (1982) (explaining purpose of
amendments to CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 980-987). If the 1947 version of Section 980 had
been left unchanged, it would be preempted by Section 301 of the Federal Copyright
Act of 1976, which specifically renders void "any rights under the common law or
statutes of a State that are equivalent to copyright and that extend to works coming
within the scope of the Federal copyright law." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 130-31 (1976).
55. CAL. CIV. CODE § 980 (emphasis added).
56. E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER 321 (1975).
57. T. CRAWFORD, THE WRITER'S LEGAL GUIDE 7 (1977).
58. Thus, it would theoretically give a screenwriter the right to produce a motion
picture from his own abstract idea, and this right could be sold to a producer. See
CAL. CIV. CODE § 982 (West 1982), which provides, in pertinent part: "(a) The owner
of any rights in any original works of authorship not fixed in any tangible medium of
expression may transfer the ownership therein."
COMM/ENT L. J.
this section therefore provides effective statutory protection for
orally-disclosed story ideas.
For the present, any discussion of the current Section 980
must unfortunately remain theoretical, as there have been no
cases to date that test its efficacy. This lack of case law is un-
derstandable in light of the considerable evidentiary problem
facing any plaintiff pleading under this statute for he must
show by extrinsic evidence that the idea was his in the first
place and that the defendant obtained it from him.
Additionally, Section 980 affords no protection to the short
forms of idea expression; it protects only oral disclosures of
purely abstract ideas. It is theoretically possible, though, to use
it in conjunction with federal copyright protection to cover
both the portion of a story idea fixed in a synopsis and an orally
disclosed abstract portion.59 Because the protections afforded
under the federal copyright law and Section 980 are mutually
exclusive-Section 980 endures only so long as the work is not
published or registered with the Copyright Office6°-the two
portions must necessarily be distinct; the oral disclosure must
cover areas not described in the synopsis. If Section 980 were
properly used in conjunction with federal copyright, the combi-
nation could conceivably form a very good theory for recovery
on a cause of action for misappropriation of the writer's entire
story concept.
Since there is not yet any case law under the new Section 980,
the elements of a cause of action for misappropriation must be
drawn inferentially from the case law developed under its
predecessor. 6' Under the previous version, a plaintiff was re-
quired to show that his work was original (he authored it) and
novel (it involved intellectual labor) and that defendant copied
it. 62 Under the present wording of the statute, it is likely that
the novelty requirement would be eliminated, since federal
copyright law requires only that a work be original. 63 Also, the
59. See infra text accompanying notes 66-70.
60. See T. CRAWFORD, supra note 57, at 7. Fixation for the purpose of rendering a
work amenable to federal copyright protection necessarily divests it of its protection
under Section 980. On the other hand, the Federal Copyright Act will not cover
works not fixed in a tangible medium. See supra note 3.
61. See supra text accompanying note 53.
62. See Kovacs v. Mutual Broadcasting Sys., 99 Cal. App. 2d 56, 62, 221 P.2d 108,
111 (1950).
63. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); see supra note 15. Section 980 is arguably an attempt to
extend protection similar to federal copyright to unfixed works.
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word "copy" is more appropriately used when a fixed expres-
sion of the idea is involved, rather than the abstract idea it-
self.64 A better term in the case of the misappropriation of an
abstract idea would be "express." Thus, a plaintiff claiming
misappropriation under the present Section 980 would have to
show that his idea was original and that defendant made an un-
authorized expression of it.
The proof required of plaintiff under Section 980, then,
would be congruent with that required under federal copyright
law,6 5 and, given the proper circumstances, both laws might be
used to protect a writer's entire story idea. Again, it is helpful
to consider this possibility in the context of a hypothetical situ-
ation. Assume that a writer and a producer meet in the pro-
ducer's office to discuss the writer's concept for a feature film.
The writer has set forth the major components of the idea in a
ten-page synopsis. He has copyrighted this document and has
received a registration certificate.6
The producer is given a copy of the synopsis in order to con-
sider the merits of the proposed story. The writer then orally
discloses portions of his motion picture concept not embodied
in the brief synopsis. These portions of the idea go beyond the
portions represented in the synopsis, they do not merely elabo-
rate on its contents. There is a logical need for such supple-
mental material, since a synopsis cannot possibly encompass all
the nuances of a motion picture, as noted in the previous
section.67
Two months pass and the writer is informed that the produc-
tion company cannot use the story concept. Two years later, a
film embodying both the written and oral portions of the
writer's concept is released. The writer brings suit, alleging in-
fringement under federal copyright and common law copy-
right, as codified by California Civil Code Section 980.
At trial, the plaintiff writer proves that the portions of the
idea fixed in the synopsis and those disclosed orally are origi-
nal. He further demonstrates both copying and an expression
by introducing defendant's film into evidence. He proves to the
satisfaction of the court that the combined written and oral
portions of his idea and defendant's film are substantially simi-
64. See supra text accompanying note 27.
65. Id.
66. See supra note 26.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26 and 31.
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lar. He also shows that defendant had access to the written
portion for two months. The proof of access to the orally dis-
closed portions is naturally a more difficult one, but if plaintiff
is successful here as well, he will have established a prima facie
case of infringement under both the Federal Copyright Act and
California Civil Code Section 980.
The defendant producer in this suit could raise the scenes d
faire doctrine as a defense in this circumstance as well.6 His
argument would be that the unfixed, orally disclosed portion
contains commonly used scenes that are required for this sort
of plot and theme. 9 If the argument were successful, it would
reduce the protectible portion of plaintiff's idea to that fixed in
the synopsis and would limit plaintiff's remedy to federal
copyright.
The plaintiff could respond to this defensive tactic by proving
that the additional, unfixed portions thus disclosed are suffi-
ciently original (i.e., dissimilar to common scenes dfaire) to be
afforded protection under Section 980. If he were successful,
the plaintiff writer would prevail on the issue of liability under
the Federal Copyright Act and Section 980,70 and would then
have to prove damages.
The absence of judicial interpretation of the present Section
980 renders the proof of damages, like that of liability, a specu-
lative area.71 The case law, however, that evolved under the
previous statute may provide a helpful analogy. In 1949, the
court in Read v. Turner72 described damages recoverable under
Section 980 as "the amount which will compensate for all detri-
ment proximately caused by the copyright infringement. ' '73
The court elaborated:
Factors to be considered in determining this detriment include
the loss in value of the subject matter of the copyright because
of the infringement; the value of the work of the owner
thereof in creating such; the value of its use by another; and
the loss of profit sustained by the owner on account of the
infringement.74
68. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
69. Id.
70. This hypothetical suit admittedly involves much speculation. The underlying
theories are, however, sound.
71. The statute is silent regarding damages.
72. 239 Cal. App. 2d 504, 48 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1966).
73. Id. at 514, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 925-26.
74. Id.
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The "value" in this standard would naturally turn on the evi-
dence available to the plaintiff. Assuming the defendant made
profitable use of the work, the plaintiff would have that profit
figure to use in computing his damages.
Decided several years prior to Read, Kovacs v. Mutual Broad-
casting System75 illustrates that the primary evidence on the
issue of damages under Section 980 may be the word of the
plaintiff. In that case, a radio program owner testified that the
value of his property was $100,000 and that it became worthless
after defendant's use. The court held that "[t]his testimony is
sufficient to support the award of damages."76 Though the final
recovery was considerably less than the amount claimed, Ko-
vacs nevertheless shows that the writer's own testimony may
be of value in establishing damages."
C. Contract Theories
The failure of copyright law to provide adequate protection
for motion picture and television story ideas has led to the de-
velopment of a body of law providing protection based on con-
tract theory.78 All of the primary forms of contract--express
contract, implied contract, and the equitable doctrine of quasi-
contract-have been brought to bear on the problem.
1. Express Contract
"An idea, if valuable, may be the subject of contract. While
the idea disclosed may be common or even open to public
knowledge,. . . such disclosure if protected by contract, is suf-
ficient consideration for the promise to pay. ' 79 This statement
in Weitzenkorn v. Lesser8 ° expresses what would be a very
hopeful judicial view for purveyors of ideas, were the realities
of the submission/purchase process different.
A consideration of two major California cases dealing with
75. 99 Cal. App. 2d 56, 221 P.2d 108 (1950).
76. Id. at 67, 221 P.2d at 115.
77. From a functional standpoint, damages available under Section 980 and under
federal copyright protection would probably be the same, aside from the availability
of statutory damages under the federal statute. Thus, should the plaintiff plead under
the two statutes as in the above hypothetical situation, the court's determination of
damages would not be more difficult than usual.
78. See generally Nimrer, supra note 18, at 124-38.
79. Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 40 Cal. 2d 778, 791-92, 256 P.2d 947, 957 (1953) (citing




idea misappropriation reveals that if a writer can reach the liti-
gation stage, the courts may be receptive to his allegation of
express contract. The plaintiffs in most of the major California
idea cases have pleaded breach of express contract as a primary
count along with several other counts in a sort of scattershot
approach. 1 In Weitzenkorn v. Lesser,2 plaintiff alleged that
her synopsis "was submitted to [defendants] at their special re-
quest, 'pursuant to an express oral understanding and agree-
ment,'" and that defendants "produced a motion picture"
which was "patterned upon and copie[d] and use[d]" her synop-
sis without paying her or giving her screen credit.8 3 The trial
court sustained defendants' demurrer to this count without
leave to amend, but the California Supreme Court reversed this
ruling. The court stated:
The charge of breach of contract, however, is dependent upon
the allegation that the motion picture "is patterned upon and
copies and uses" Weitzenkorn's composition. If, as a matter of
law, there is no similarity whatsoever between the produc-
tions, the first count does not state a cause of action. However,
although there is no similarity between protectible portions of
Weitzenkorn's composition and the defendants' production,
similarity may exist because of the combination of characters,
locale and myth.84
The court went on to note that it was conceivable, though im-
probable, that a showing could be made that the parties con-
tracted to pay plaintiff for the use of any portion of her
production, protectible or not.' The protectible portions to
which the court referred were the original ideas represented in
plaintiff's synopsis. Because there was a possibility, however
remote, that the parties agreed to such a contractual arrange-
ment, the court held that the demurrer was improperly sus-
tained. Such a showing by the plaintiff, along with evidence of
similarity, properly should be presented to the trier of fact.8
81. Id. at 779-80, 256 P.2d at 950; Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 724-25, 299 P.2d
257, 260-61 (1956) (motion picture allegedly infringed plaintiffs synopsis); Fink v.
Goodson-Todson Enters., 9 Cal. App. 3d 996, 88 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1970) (television series
allegedly based on plaintiff's series presentation); Faris v. Enberg, 97 Cal. App. 3d 309,
158 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1979) (television sports quiz show allegedly used plaintiff's televi-
sion format).
82. 40 Cal. 2d at 780, 256 P.2d at 947.
83. Id.
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Two important principles can be derived from Weitzenkorn.
First, it is possible to contract expressly for a non-novel idea in
the abstract; second, the evidence of similarity required to sus-
tain a cause of action for breach may be satisfied by a showing
of similar combinations of plot, setting, and theme.
In the more recent case of Fink v. Goodson-Todman Enter-
prises,s7 the California Court of Appeal followed the position
laid down in Weitzenkorn, holding that the "protectibility"
characteristic of literary property, i.e., novelty, is not required
where an express contract is alleged.8 The basis for this view
was that "a contract creates no monopoly; it is effective only
between the contracting parties; it does not withdraw the idea
from general circulation or place a restraint on progress in
art ' ' s9 as would copyright protection. The Goodson-Todman
court also noted that, while a trial court may test whether the
allegedly offending work is based upon, rather than substan-
tially similar to, the plaintiff's work,90 "essentially we have the
same quest for the same points of similarity and the same anal-
ysis as to quantitative and qualitative factors in both the con-
tract and the non-contract counts."91
Thus, an express contractual arrangement could go far be-
yond that protection afforded by the previously discussed forms
of copyright.9 2 An idea embodied in any of the short forms of
expression, as well as one disclosed orally, could be made the
subject of such a contract. With respect to a plaintiff's eviden-
tiary burden, the test in a contract action is comparable to that
in copyright, in that substantial similarity would support a find-
ing of use by the defendant. 3 Special note should be made,
however, of the "based upon" standard set forth in Goodson-
Todman, by which the similarities in the works perhaps need
not be as pronounced as when proving substantial similarity. 9
Future litigation is necessary to test this standard's worth.
While the common law express contract theory offers some
hope for a writer, the nature of the bargaining process makes it
87. 9 Cal. App. 3d 996, 88 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1970).
88. Id. at 1009, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
89. Id. at 1008, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 689 (citing M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
§ 169, at 726).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1010, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 15-77.
93. See supra text accompanying note 28.
94. See 9 Cal. App. 3d at 1008, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
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difficult for the writer to obtain a contractual basis for suit. A
free-lance writer dealing with a major independent producer
does not do so on an equal footing. Assuming the existence of
an express contract, it is likely to take a form that gives an
enormous amount of power to the producer.95 It is difficult to
imagine any producer agreeing to terms that are substantially
favorable to the writer, as the producer has access to a veritable
sea of ideas, generated both by other outside free-lance
hopefuls 96 and by inside production personnel.97 The most po-
tent element in the dealings between writer and producer is the
release form.98 Though of doubtful legality since it is an adhe-
sion contract, 99 the release is commonly employed by produ-
cers. It is in effect a waiver of the writer's right to sue, should
the producer later develop material similar to that submitted
by the writer.100
This apparently unbalanced situation has led to collective
bargaining,10 1 at least in the context of television program nego-
tiations. The Writers Guild of America (Guild) and the net-
works, along with many television producers, have agreed that
fixed fees be paid for scripts written by the Guild's members.
1 0 2
The Guild also protects the interests of its members at the idea-
submission stage.103
Unless a writer is a member of the Guild, contractual deal-
ings are, at best, uncertain. If the magnitude of the concept's
originality and its potential box office value are sufficiently
great, a producer might be induced to negotiate without the
standard tools-release forms and stipulated amount/recovery
clauses.0 4 Without the presence of external factors aug-
95. See Libott, supra note 3, at 763-64.
96. See supra text accompanying note 8.
97. See W. ROOT, supra note 5, at 146.
98. See Libott, supra note 3, at 764.
99. Id. An adhesion contract is a "standardized contract, which, imposed and
drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party
only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it." Neal v. State Farm Ins.
Cos., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 694, 10 Cal. Rptr. 781, 784 (1961).
100. See T. CRAWFORD, supra note 57, at 80-81; Libott, supra note 3, at 764.
101. See Libott, supra note 3, at 764.
102. See W. ROOT, supra note 5, at 178.
103. See generally Constitution and By-Laws of the Writers Guild of America,
West, Inc., art. II (Objects), §§ 1-7 (1980).
104. If, in spite of a release, the writer successfully sues and recovers for misappro-
priation, the maximum recovery or stipulated amount provisions in the contract limit
the recovery to a stipulated maximum value of the writer's work. See T. CRAWFORD,
supra note 57, at 81.
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menting the writer's bargaining power, however, an express
contract is a good idea in theory but of little value in practice.
2. Implied Contract
Where the writer and the producer have not expressly
agreed on the terms of an idea purchase, but the producer is
aware of the idea's substance and has issued a product very
much like it, the writer may be able to establish a contract im-
plied in fact.10 5 Such a contract is distinguished from an ex-
press contract by the fact that " 'the promise is not expressed in
words but is implied from the promisor's conduct,' or 'inferred
from circumstantial evidence.' "106
The elements required to support a theory of implied con-
tract are enumerated in the 1979 case of Faris v. Enberg.0 7 A
plaintiff must show that he authored the work; that he submit-
ted it to the offeree for sale; and that under the totality of the
circumstances surrounding submission it could be concluded
that the offeree accepted the disclosure of the work voluntarily,
knowing both the conditions under which it was submitted and
the reasonable value of the tendered work.1
0 8
In Faris, plaintiff approached defendant with his television
sports quiz show format and inquired whether defendant would
be willing to host the show. The format's substance was dis-
closed to defendant, but there was "no evidence that plaintiff
expected, or indicated his expectation of receiving compensa-
tion for the service of revealing the format to [defendant]. To
the contrary, the sole evidence is that plaintiff voluntarily sub-
mitted it ..... 109 The court considered the holding in Weit-
zenkorn that even if no similarity between the works exists,
plaintiff may still attempt to prove an agreement to pay for
plaintiff's work."0 It also considered the ruling by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Desny v. Wilder"' that disclosure of an
105. See generally Nimmer, supra note 18, at 133-40.
106. Jack, supra note 52, at 17-18 (quoting Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 40 Cal. 2d 778,
256 P.2d 257 (1953), and Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956)). It should
be noted that courts have referred to the implied-in-fact contract as a type of express
contract. See, e.g., Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d at 739, 299 P.2d at 270.
107. 97 Cal. App. 3d 309, 158 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1979).
108. Id. at 318, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 709 (citing Desny, 46 Cal. 2d at 744, 299 P.2d at 273).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 317, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 708 (citing Weitzenkorn, 40 Cal. 2d at 792, 256 P.2d
at 957).
111. 46 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d at 257.
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abstract idea may be consideration for a promise to pay regard-
less of the idea's novelty." 2 On this point, the Desny court is-
sued a caveat: "The idea man who blurts out his idea without
having first made his bargain has no one but himself to blame
for the loss of his bargaining power.""' 3 Thus, where an idea is
disclosed without the condition of remuneration, the law will
not imply a promise to pay."
4
When the court applied these holdings to the Faris facts, it
found that plaintiff's unconditioned disclosure would not sup-
port an implied contract theory and that the trial court's sum-
mary judgment as to that cause of action was proper." 5 There
was no evidence that plaintiff conveyed to defendant his expec-
tation of payment for disclosing his format." 6
Thus, it appears that the remedy under an implied contract
theory for idea misappropriation is limited to very specific fac-
tual circumstances. For example, a writer may tell a producer
that he has an idea for a television pilot and series. The pro-
ducer indicates interest, and the writer then cautions him that
he will only show or explain it to him if the producer agrees to
pay for it. The producer, incredulous, asks why he should pay
for something without first knowing what it is and whether it is
of value. The writer, however, maintains his desire for pay-
ment. The producer consents only on the condition that the
reasonable value will be paid if his company uses the idea. At
this point, disclosure is made. In this illustration, the idea man
refrained from blurting out his idea, as the plaintiff did in
Desny, and therefore maintained his bargaining power.
The practical problem with this illustration is that it assumes
that the writer actually had some bargaining power in the first
place. In reality, much depends upon who the writer is, what
kind of connections and track record he has, and how well the
producer knows him and trusts his creative abilities. Thus,
such contracts giving significant power to the writer are rare.
3. Quasi-Contract
Technically, quasi-contractual recovery does not depend on
contractual theory, but rather on equitable principles. A court
112. Id. at 739, 299 P.2d at 269.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 97 Cal. App. 3d at 318, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
116. Id.
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may imply a contract in law, rather than from the facts, and
thereby award restitution for unjust benefits conferred.
117
The most recent judicial statement on the quasi-contract the-
ory in this area is Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc.,118 decided
by the California Court of Appeal in 1982. Plaintiff, a profes-
sional hairdresser, submitted an outline through a friend to an
independent production company affiliated with Columbia Pic-
tures. Subsequently, Columbia released the film "Shampoo,"
and plaintiff claimed a misappropriation of the idea in her out-
line. Citing Weitzenkorn, the court stated that plaintiff must
introduce the same evidence to recover on a quasi-contractual
theory as she would under a tort theory of plagiarism. Thus,
the material which was allegedly misappropriated must be pro-
tectible literary property.'19 Because it was the form and man-
ner of expression that constituted the protectible portion of
plaintiff's idea, the trial court found that "'there is no substan-
tial similarity' between 'Shampoo' and plaintiff's outline as to
form and manner of expression .... ,1120 Based on this factual
finding, the Court of Appeal concluded that Mann could not
recover upon a quasi-contractual ground for the alleged use of
her ideas, since defendants had used no property belonging to
her.
121
From a practical standpoint, quasi-contractual recovery
stands apart from true contract theory. The requirement of
protectibility, which is not at issue in a contract action, forces
the plaintiff to establish the same factual elements as would be
required for copyright infringement. Pondering this require-
ment, one writer has concluded that "the California court's pro-
hibition against ideas being the subject of quasi-contract is a
wholly unsupported and unwarranted anomaly, necessitated
only for consistency with Section 980.''122 The Mann decision
was handed down little more than a month after the amended
Section 980 went into effect.12 3 As previously discussed, the
new wording of the statute is such that abstract ideas are pro-
tected until the time they are represented or expressed.
124
117. See A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRAcTS 27-30 (1st ed. 1952).
118. 128 Cal. App. 3d 628, 180 Cal. Rptr. 522 (1982).
119. Id. at 634, 180 Cal. Rptr at 526.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Jack, supra note 52, at 14.
123. At the time of the above quotation Section 980 had not been amended.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
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Since the Mann cause of action arose during the time that the
prior statute was in effect, the court applied the former Section
980 as governing law. There is, therefore, no statement from
the courts as to whether the change in Section 980 will effect a
change in the protectible property requirement. If there is a
correlation between the statute and this common law rule, as
the above-mentioned writer suggests, it will be interesting to
see the result in the next case in which quasi-contract is
pleaded as a ground for recovery.
Of the contract theories, then, only the first two are essen-
tially contractual, and only they can afford a writer protection
for his work beyond either statutory or common law copyright.
Because the measure of damages under the theories of implied
contract and quasi-contract is the reasonable value of the work,
such theories are neither more nor less desirable bases of re-
covery than statutory copyright or common law copyright.
125
Only express contract recovery offers any advantage from the
standpoint of damages available, but, as previously discussed, it
is not common for the writer to have a contractual monetary
advantage in the first place. Because express and implied con-
tracts would protect an abstract idea through and beyond the
submission process to a point after the film or television show
has been shown, they are the most complete method of shield-
ing the raw concept.
D. Other Theories
1. Fraud
The fifth count of the complaint in Fink v. Goodson-Todman
Enterprises2 alleged that "defendants should be liable in dam-
ages because they fraudulently induced plaintiff not to vend his
program to other producers.' 27 The court declared that the al-
legations contained in this count were insufficient to state a
cause of action. 28 Plaintiff failed to allege that defendants had,
without his consent, broadcast the allegedly damaging televi-
sion program. Furthermore, he failed to allege that defend-
ant's series contained so many elements of his own work that
125. See Faris v. Enberg, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 318, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 709 (plaintiff must
show reasonable value of work for implied contract); see also Jack, supra note 52, at
14.
126. 9 Cal. App. 3d 996, 88 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1970).
127. Id. at 1005, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
128. Id.
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the latter was rendered valueless and therefore unsaleable, nor
did he offer support for his purported reliance on the false rep-
resentations of defendants concerning the saleablilty of his pro-
gram. This last omission was particularly damaging in light of
evidence that plaintiff had sufficient experience in screenwrit-
ing to have known whether his program had value.
129
Although the court in Goodson-Todman-the only California
idea case in which fraud has been pleaded as a ground for re-
covery-rejected this theory, it is not without merit. If the fail-
ings found by the court were cast in affirmative language, the
elements that the court would consider sufficient emerge:
(1) that production personnel misrepresented the worth of the
story idea submitted and defendant's intentions with re-
spect to the idea (e.g., a manifestation of intent to exercise
an option); and
(2) that plaintiff justifiably relied on the misrepresentation; 130
and
(3) that contrary to their misrepresented intent concerning the
idea, defendants neither purchased it nor returned it, but
rather, defendants produced and distributed a work which
makes substantial, unauthorized use of plaintiff's idea; and
(4) that plaintiff's own work was rendered valueless by the of-
fending work due to the incorporation of elements of plain-
tiff's work.
The intent of this note is not to suggest that many motion
picture and television idea exchange deals are subject to fraud.
It is not inconceivable, however, that fraud may be a very real
element in some cases of misappropriation, especially where
the writer is relatively unsophisticated with respect to such
dealings. In those cases where fraud is an element, it should be
alleged.
2. Interference with Prospective Business Advantage
To establish the tort of interference with a prospective busi-
ness advantage where the advantage has not yet become con-
tractual, a plaintiff must demonstrate not only his deprivation
of a potential business advantage, but also the wrongful quality
129. Id.
130. The surrounding circumstances must indicate either that plaintiff lacked suf-
ficient experience to be aware of the falsity of the misrepresentation, or that the mis-
representation was such that it was reasonably believable and would have prevented a
reasonable screenwriter from seeking to market his idea elsewhere.
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of the defendant's actions.' 3 ' The wrongfulness of the defend-
ant's actions may be demonstrated by an improper motive.
3 2
For example, the fact that a production company holds on to a
writer's submission for an extended period without indications
of interest may be evidence of a motive to create a similar
work. The writer would not, in such a case, present his idea to
another production unit while the first company was consider-
ing it. Thus, it may be inferred that the tortfeasor in such a
case retained the idea to prevent its release by a competing pro-
duction company before its own version could be released. This
theory may be used as an adjunct or alternative to the fraud
theory as set forth above, since it also may be applicable to a
situation in which the conduct of the production company ef-
fectively prevents the writer from marketing a valuable story
idea.
In the federal case of Miller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, 33 interference with prospective business advantage was
one of the many theories pleaded.' 34 Unfortunately, the Miller
case is not a useful precedent in predicting the viability of such
claims. The claim was pendent to a copyright infringement
claim, and the sole issue before the court was summary judg-
ment on the copyright claim. 3 The case nevertheless shows
that this theory may be considered by counsel for the plaintiff
as an alternative ground for idea misappropriation. Since the
area of litigation dealing with the protection of motion picture
and television story ideas is still evolving, this theory may
emerge as a viable alternative or additional basis for recovery.
IV
Conclusion
A. Tactics: Before Misappropriation
The foregoing discussion of the law concerning motion pic-
ture and television story ideas illustrates some of the available
methods to protect a writer's idea. The most effective is to take
the time and trouble to write a final script, such that the full
131. See Rickel v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 144 Cal. App. 3d 648, 658, 192 Cal. Rptr. 732,
738 (1983).
132. Id.
133. 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 502 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
134. Id. at 503.
135. Id.
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weight of federal copyright protection may be brought to bear
against potential infringers.'
If, as is often the case, the writer opts for the synopsis, out-
line, treatment, or format form, he may take advantage of the
registration service offered by the Writers Guild of America,
West. As well as deterring potential misappropriators, Guild
registration may provide a useful evidentiary tool should the
writer be forced to sue for misappropriation.
One lesson to be learned from Desny v. Wilder"3 7 and Faris
v. Enberg3 8 is that the writer must refrain from disclosing the
substance of his idea until both parties have agreed that the
producer will pay the writer for the idea.
The writer must also be wary of any boilerplate contracts
presented to him by production personnel. If, on the other
hand, the terms are negotiated, a producer-drafted contract
may safely be accepted as evidence of the agreement. It should
set forth all relevant terms-e.g., price or a pricing standard,
conditions for terminating the contract, and option clauses. In
short, it should leave no uncertainties upon which a producer
may hang his hat.
As for release forms, it is not recommended that a writer be-
come a party to such a one-sided legal relationship. The stipu-
lated amount/maximum recovery clauses found in many
contracts may provide for a figure that is at wide variance with
the eventual work produced from the idea, so these provisions
should be scrutinized carefully before the contract is signed.
B. Litigation Tactics
Once it becomes necessary to bring a suit for misappropria-
tion of a story idea, the tactics will largely be dictated by the
form in which the idea is embodied and by whether federal
copyright registration has been obtained. Generally, a plaintiff
should plead all available remedial theories because of the po-
tential difficulty in recovering under any one of them.
If federal copyright protection is available and a short form
of expression is at issue, discovery should be vigorously pursued
in order to determine whether the defendant worked up his
136. See supra text accompanying notes 32-36. For a discussion of practical reasons
to write a full screenplay, see W. RoOr, supra note 5, at 172.
137. 46 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956).
138. 97 Cal. App. 3d 309, 158 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1979).
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own short form from the plaintiff's. The plaintiff may be able
to establish it as the infringing work if it led to the motion pic-
ture or television program that rendered the plaintiff's own
work valueless.
Under some circumstances, a plaintiff may be able to proceed
under a federal copyright infringement theory for a copy-
righted short form and use California Civil Code Section 980 as
a basis for recovery for the misappropriation of the orally dis-
closed remainder of plaintiff's story idea. Such an approach is
still untried, but it is theoretically possible to prevail under
such dual causes of action, given the right set of circumstances
and the necessary evidentiary showing.
139
Alternatively, California Civil Code Section 980 may provide
a very good statutory shield for abstract ideas that are orally
disclosed to a producer. Critical to such a suit is a witness's tes-
timony that the writer disclosed the idea to the producer, with
an account of the circumstances under which this took place.
Ultimately, the law governing misappropriation for a Califor-
nia plaintiff does hold some hope, since it provides several theo-
ries applicable to a variety of situations. Though the efficacy of
some of these theories is uncertain, the aggregate body of law
may offer recovery to the plaintiff writer who has proceeded
with circumspection during the submission process and during
the litigation following the theft and exploitation of his idea.
139. See supra text accompanying note 70.
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